INITIAL SITUATION
Civilian crisis intervention designed to prevent violent escalation by means of conflict management or help transform conflicts sustainable to a lower violence form, is overshadowed by the preparation and implementation of military crisis interventions, although the latter are invariably referred to as a “means of last resort”. On the other hand, the pressing need for civilian crisis prevention and management is increasingly recognised and both political and financial support is forthcoming. The following are the principal underlying reasons:
§ The growing number of intra-state conflicts,
§ the increasing world-wide economic, political, ecological and military interdependence and
§ problems arising from military conflict intervention.
Growing number of intra-state conflicts
One of the major challenges facing conflict management consists in the fact that, although the end of colonial rule and of the East-West confrontation has resulted in fewer international wars, it has failed to prevent an increase in violent intra-state conflicts and in international terrorism. Both are characterised by a multitude of multifaceted causes and by a great variety of conflict parties plus proponents. Such chaotic conflicts usually defy traditional approaches, diplomacy and military missions. The same applies to acts of terrorism, as evidenced by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.
Increasing worldwide economic, political ecological and military interdependence
The increasing economic, political, ecological and military interdependence causes the impact of crises to be felt worldwide (world market, climate change, migration, dismantling of democracy, armament proliferation). As a result, the rule of “non-intervention” in intra-state conflicts is giving way to the principle of legitimate intervention, and especially international governmental and non-governmental associations that have taken on security and peace policy tasks are called upon to intervene and settle conflicts. The opportunity to respond to this challenge was broadened, when the division into spheres of interest and the resulting blocking manoeuvres by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the UN Security Council came to an end.
Problems involved in military conflict intervention
The above-described development provides the legitimacy background to enhanced military efforts and the safeguarding of power-political interests worldwide. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has failed to generate restraint on power-political and military reasoning. On the contrary: In order to safeguard power-political interests worldwide and to legitimise military efforts, security deficits and defence concepts are broadened into a global perception of risk. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 is among the events cited as justification. The new NATO doctrine, the “new American internationalism” (US Senator McCaine), efforts to build a European defence alliance or the US-American “National Missile Defense” (NMD) are cases in point. Moreover, attempts are being made to transform peacekeeping, which is traditionally based on consensus between the conflict parties and the UN, into peace enforcement to serve the purposes of complex operations in the context of intra-state conflicts.
However, the efforts bent on settling conflicts and on preventing wars through armament and military prevention are suffering from a loss of credibility and more often than not turn out to be counterproductive. The following has been clearly evidenced by military operations in the Gulf, in Somalia, in Yugoslavia, in Afghanistan and in Iraq:
· The mere preparation of military operations as a means of last resort implies the preformation and majorisation of settlement efforts by military considerations. Even the threat of external military force has failed to de-escalate conflicts. On the contrary: It has buoyed the hardliners among the conflict parties and entailed further escalation.
· Arming conflict parties against enemies that are classified as a menace, under the motto that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” tends to escalate conflicts rather than to de-escalate them, which was demonstrated by the cases of Saddam Hussein, Noriega and Osama Bin Laden.
· In the majority of cases, the use of armed force tends to impede political solutions rather than to facilitate them. They are not helpful in solving the problems underlying the conflicts (e.g. in the case of Kosovo).
· The use of military force causes devastation (casualties – mostly among the civilian population, material damage to buildings and infrastructure, ecological damage) with long lasting consequences for the minds of the people.
· When it comes to violent intra-state conflicts, the use of armed force is even more questionable than in international wars. It is mainly the civilian population that suffers (e.g. collateral damage).
· Interventions without a UN mandate carried out by the USA or NATO weaken the United Nations and undermine the role of conflict resolution mechanisms put in place by international and national institutions and the role of international law.
· In terms of democratic policy-making the political and propagandist preparations and the back-up for the use of armed force trigger problematic developments. They generate and confirm prejudices and hostile perceptions as well as notions of military security including the legitimacy and enforcement of armament measures.
· The social costs of armament and the use of armed force are enormous.
CRITERIA OF EFFECTIVE CIVILIAN CRISIS INTERVENTION
The described conditions lend growing importance to civilian crisis intervention. However, its effectiveness depends on the observance of the following criteria:
Prevent crises escalation at the earliest possible point in time
It is uncontested that the prevention of crises is better than their cure. It appears to be equally uncontested that there is a gap between early warning signals, of which there are usually many, and effective as well as efficient political response (early action). There are two principal preconditions of crisis prevention:
1. Reliable early detection, based on a standardised assessment matrix for the classification of crisis situations as well as on procedures for the timing of preventive measures.
2. Feasible plans for conflict intervention, which take into account the specific circumstances and conditions prevailing in the conflict region as well as the options open to the agents capable of intervening.
Unless these two criteria are met, early warning will not be effective nor will it lead to effective early action.
Address conflicts at their roots
Civilian crisis intervention has to address the manifold (mostly civilian) roots of crises. Throughout the world, the number of people living below the poverty line is rising and currently accounts for more than half of the world population. Globalisation poses a challenge in all areas of societal development. It causes worldwide division of labour, increasing the fragmentation of daily life (e.g. into family and work) and of societies (e.g. by excluding sections of the population) and consequently leading to disarray. The results are identity problems instrumentalised for their purposes by decision-makers who link up tangible shortcomings within societies with people’s only remaining, secure basis for action: their ethnic and religious identity. Instead of responding to or taking account of needs, politicians and religious leaders instrumentalise this sense of identity for “solutions” in the form of fundamentalism or nationalism. Unsatisfied needs are exploited to boost destructive aggressions and downright violence in the service of particular interests.
Identity problems among large parts of the population and the legitimacy problems of decision makers constitute a challenge primarily to democratic policy making, which requires the conceptual integration of all social distance levels – from the intra-personal to the international. Concepts, such as “strong identity”, “gender awareness”, “civil society”, “open society”, “good governance”, “subsidiarity”, and “solidarity” represent the conceptual arguments conducted in this context, in which committed citizens and NGOs are playing an increasingly important role.
Awareness that the socio-political fields of conflict are invariably characterised by more than one underlying cause is essential in civilian crisis intervention, lest crucial aspects be neglected in their management. It is counterproductive to underrate the causes of conflicts or to reduce them (e.g. to ethnicity).
Important policy areas for civilian crisis intervention, which admittedly lack clean lines of demarcation and frequently overlap, can be derived from the underlying structural conditions and the causes of conflicts given below:
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UNDERLYING STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS AND CAUSES OF CONFLICTS |
POLICY AREAS |
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Human rights/ state/ society (disregard of human rights and of national, religious and ethnic groups as well as political repression and bad governance) |
Protection and promotion of human rights and of specific sections of the population |
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Economy/ecology (misery and fear caused by social, economic and ecological conditions) |
Supporting sustainable socio-economic and ecological development |
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Security (no separation of political and military leadership, offensive military strategies, privatisation, etc.) |
Crisis prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace consolidation |
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Culture/education/information (insufficient options for cultural and artistic development, education and free flow of information) |
Promotion of culture, education and information |
Gear measures to the needs of those concerned, involve and empower them and help them take charge of shaping societal conditions
People living in crisis regions must not be instrumentalised as objects of interventions, but involved and empowered according to their needs. The following principal needs can be attributed to the four above-mentioned policy areas:
§ the need for equality, self-determination and for a say in decision-making;
§ the need for well-being;
§ the need for security;
§ the need for guiding principles and a social frame of reference.
If crisis intervention is geared to these needs, prevailing mind-sets and behaviour patterns of the conflict agents can be sustainably aligned towards a stabilisation of the situation. This is one more prerequisite for those concerned to take charge of shaping their societal conditions (ownership), so that the international players can withdraw.
Avoid negative effects
When offering help in conflict situations, good intentions are less than inadequate. In ugly situations, help may even cause the opposite of what is intended. Hence it is crucial for all conflict interventions to have negative sequels that may contribute to a violent escalation of conflicts identified by means of “conflict impact assessments” and in this way to avoid adding to the harm (do no harm). It is imperative to collect sufficient background information about the conflict, its causes, its course as well as about the internal and external agents involved in it. Before an intervention, all the international players need to ask themselves the following questions:
§ In what way and to what extent will the intervention help to achieve the objectives of peace and development policies and of establishing security?
§ In what way will the conflict impact on the intervention?
§ In what way will the intervention influence the conflict dynamics?
§ Which alternative options can be considered in the decision-making process?
Seek to achieve a lasting de-escalation of the conflicts
Civilian crisis intervention must seek to contribute to a lasting de-escalation of the conflicts. In the Supplement to the “Agenda For Peace” of former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali it was underlined that crises will not end, once agreement is reached on a cease-fire or on elections. What has to be done, once a cease-fire has been agreed is to prepare the ground for a negotiated settlement of the conflict, which has to be implemented with “outside” support. Moreover, coordinated programmes have to be put in place which address and eliminate the root causes of the conflict.
The role of embargos and sanctions in achieving political objectives is at best limited
The more closely international organisations become involved in conflict areas, the more often they are faced with the issue of “political conditionality” - in other words, the use of incentives (more aid in exchange for democratisation and reduction of violence potentials) and of sanctions (less aid in the case of violence build-up). At a meeting devoted to development cooperation (DC), held at the Heinrich-Böll Stiftung in December 1999, this questions was answered as follows:
· DC conditionality should be applied in crisis prevention whenever possible, though its impact is limited.
§ Conflict identification has to be improved, i.e. objectified by institutionalising and applying crisis indicators.
§ DC conditionalisation presupposes the coordination of the most important donors. Cooperation needs to be substantially improved at least within the EU, so that in certain cases (such as Ethiopia) one might even brave the US.
Sanctions should never hit the distressed population, as was the case in Iraq. According to Manfred Kulessa, guidelines for a European sanctions policy might look as follows:
§ Europe should not set up its own system of sanctions but should, in this sphere as well, seek to secure a UN monopoly on the use of force.
§ Europe should evaluate the experience gathered in the implementation of UN sanctions and international control measures and input new proposals into the international discussion.
§ Europe should become more actively involved in the discussion about “smart sanctions”.
§ Europe should support the reforms under way on the UN system of sanctions.
§ Europe should object to the Security Council being instrumentalised by great powers for their own political ends.
§ Europe should, on principle, advocate the limited duration of sanctions.
§ Europe should advocate the fair compensation of third countries.
§ Europe should actively promote scientific studies on the issue of sanctions.
Be aware of the interdependence of humanitarian aid, development cooperation and conflict management
Governmental and international organisations, such as the OECD and the World Bank, have responded to the fact that humanitarian aid and investments, often raised with great difficulty, have with growing frequency fallen victim to the violent escalation of conflicts in deeply riven societies (e.g. Ruanda). They seek to put humanitarian aid and development cooperation within the context of conflict development and to link up the two aspects. When helping to rebuild a society devastated by war, aid for material reconstruction should be combined with measures conducive to the social, cultural and political development.
Utilise the specific merits of non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
The increasingly important role of NGOs in crisis intervention is being generally acknowledged. The above-mentioned developments in the security-policy area and the problems governmental crisis management has in coping with them, have been major driving forces behind the setting up of NGOs. On the one hand, NGOs owe their emergence to the fact that vital societal needs are not being met. On the other hand, they owe it to the fact that governmental organisations are considered incapable or unwilling to improve the situation.
The outcome is a dichotomy between governmental organisations and NGOs, which may vary between rejection and assimilation, depending on the attitude adopted by the two sides. In dictatorships the relationship tends to polarise towards one of the two attitudes: being either antagonistic or assimilating. In the latter case, the resulting entities are referred to as “GONGOs” (governmental non-governmental organisations) or “QUANGOs” (quasi-NGOs). In democracies the important role of the civil society and the assistance it has to offer are increasingly acknowledged by governments, and cooperation between governmental organisations and NGOs is constructive and of mutual benefit. Governmental organisations are assisted by NGOs in identifying the major political, social, economic and ecological problems and, as a result, gain legitimacy. Conversely, cooperation with governmental organisations may help NGOs to gain financial and political support in achieving their own objectives.
The specific merits of international NGOs in the context of civilian crisis intervention are mainly the following:
§ NGOs need not represent government interests nor comply with diplomatic conventions. This gives them greater leeway for action. Occasionally, not being an “official entity” may be to their disadvantage, since it means less political legitimacy and no diplomatic immunity.
§ NGOs are less prone to be suspected of representing power-political interests which they seek to exploit to their own advantage. On the other hand, NGOs have less leverage, e.g. through economic conditionality.
§ NGOs are more flexible (no longdrawn legitimation procedures within individual countries or vis-à-vis partner countries) and are consequently better placed than governmental organisations to implement preventive measures.
§ Some NGOs can mobilise initiatives, tools, human and financial resources, which are not or not as easily accessible to governmental organisations. What applies to a great number of NGOs is that they are understaffed and underfunded and find it hard to guarantee the financial and social security of their staff (self-exploitation).
“Internal” non-governmental players are important contacts and partners for international governmental and non-governmental agents. They can make sure that outside aid is actually channelled to where it is needed and to those in need. In a situation of political dictatorship, their support is frequently decisive in changing prevailing conditions. The merits of non-governmental players, native to conflict areas, in the context of civilian crisis intervention are mainly the following:
§ The work of non-governmental agents has less to do with formal relationships and the interests of political factions and more with the needs of their protagonists for well-being, for a say in decision-making, for security, guiding principles and a social frame of reference (against de-solidarisation and the destruction of meaningful life).
§ Non-governmental players are better placed to deal with the roots and the agents of conflicts within societies (unlike their institutional and political counterparts). Hence, they address not only the factual conflicts but also the relational conflicts, which frequently date back many generations.
However, both sides – that is to say the non-governmental players within the conflict region and those agents wishing to help them from outside - are frequently confronted with the following sets of problems:
§ For non-governmental players within the conflict region cooperation with “external” agents may imply that
§ their relations with intra-state governmental organisations deteriorate and may even end in political, police and military persecution and repression;
§ their relations with other intra-state non-governmental organisations deteriorate, due to jealousies and rivalries;
§ the relationship with partners abroad may lead to dependence and an unintended, possibly even harmful modification of their objectives and activities (patronising attitude).
§ For agents trying to help from outside, cooperation with non-governmental players within the conflict region may imply that their support is misused in the pursuit of objectives they never intended to achieve.
Both international agents and non-governmental domestic players must therefore proceed with caution.
Cooperation between the international governmental and non-governmental players
Rivalries over economic interests and political prestige frequently incite states or organisations to put their own interests and standing before cooperating with other organisations in the crisis region. In this context the hegemony of the USA, which is very reluctant to cooperate either at the bilateral or the multilateral level in the interests of other countries, poses a special problem. Its choice of partners of doubtful democratic standing as well its relationship with the UN, its refusal to submit to the rulings of and international court of justice or to sign the Kyoto Protocol, and its behaviour at the World Conference against Racism in Durban have demonstrated the reluctance of the USA to cooperate with other democratic states in enforcing the legitimate interests of the disadvantaged. What falls by the wayside is the welfare of the populations concerned and even the success of civilian crisis interventions.
Information on actions planned and on the conflict situation
Information on the different positions of conflict parties, as well as on the positions of those willing to assist them in managing conflicts is of vital importance. International players can help to render reporting on events in the region more objective and thus counter lopsided propaganda spread by the conflict parties. Moreover, they need – as early as possible - to inform the population concerned and the institutions and organisations within the region about their plans, in order to nip rumours in the bud and also to make it easier for those in need and those willing to cooperate to contact them.
Step up the training of civilian specialist staff
More often than not, the representatives of international players in conflict areas have had little or no preparatory training for the tasks awaiting them. To make a mission successful it appears essential
§ to prepare staff for the general conditions in which they will have to act, i.e. for acute conflict situations, lack of infrastructure, crass prejudices and hostile perceptions, health and supply problems, dealing with traumatised people, etc. To be able to cope with these problems, people have to become capable of handling conflicts. This requires both knowledge of the causes, of the prevailing conditions and of the tentative solutions of conflicts as well as of the players involved in the conflict management. Moreover, they will have to engage actively with their own conflict behaviour and position vis-à-vis the conflict parties;
§ to prepare them for the function they will have to perform within the conflict area. Being a good lawyer does not in itself make you a good human rights observer;
§ to prepare them for the mission they are going to be part of. The objectives of the mission, the organisation’s special mandate and structure, strategies and logistics, but also the specific political, legal, social, cultural, economic, and security situation should be known in advance.
§ International organisations, such as the UN, the OSCE and the EU attach growing importance to the preparation for missions, and more and more national and regional governmental and non-governmental training programmes are being put in place. What is still missing however, are international training standards, based on generally recognised job profiles for the various functions to be performed.
Improve selection and recruitment of staff
The selection and terms of recruitment differ from organisation to organisation, from country to country and even inside countries (e.g. depending on the foreign ministry department in charge of recruitment). This faces the organisation that is recruiting staff, the applicants for recruitment and the organisation running the mission with serious problems. What is needed are compatible data bases with the data of applicants, which can be cross-referenced with standardised requirements (job descriptions) and will enable the recruitment of suitable staff for vacant positions.
SUMMARY
The above-described conditions and challenges demonstrate that civilian crisis intervention is vital if the violent escalation of conflicts is to be effectively prevented or if conflicts are to be transformed into a lower form of violence. To be effective, interventions will have to meet the following criteria:
§ Prevent further escalation of crises as early as possible (crisis prevention);
§ address the root causes of conflicts and consider the great variety of policy areas involved on account of the structural framework conditions and the fact that conflicts are rooted in the areas of human rights/state/society, economy/ecology, security as well as culture/education/information;
§ gear missions to the needs of those affected, involve and empower them and assist them in taking charge of societal conditions (ownership);
§ avoid adverse effects (do no harm) by systematically studying possible sequels (conflict impact assessment);
§ try to achieve lasting de-escalation of the conflicts (sustainability) beyond the immediate effect;
§ make only limited use of embargos and sanctions (conditionality) to reach political objectives;
§ take account of the interdependence of humanitarian aid, development cooperation and conflict management (interdependence);
§ utilise the specific merits of non-governmental organisations and involve the non-governmental agents native to the conflict areas;
§ seek to pool the efforts of the diverse international governmental and non-governmental players that are willing to help (cooperation);
§ supply information on your plans and intentions and help objectify reporting on the conflict situation (information);
§ step up the education and training of civilian specialist staff (up-skilling);
§ ensure efficient selection and posting of mission personnel (recruitment).
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